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The ability of players to communicate prior to playing a non-cooperative game, inuences the set of self-enforcing outcomes of that game. The communication allows the players to correlate their play, and to implement a correlated strategy prole as a feasible non-binding agreement. For such an agreement to be self-enforcing, it has to be stable against plausible coalitional deviations.
Two notions in the literature describe such self-enforcing agreements: a strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated prole that is stable against all coalitional deviations, while a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is a correlated prole that is stable against self-enforcing coalitional deviations ([6] ). For a coalition of a single player, any deviation is self-enforcing. For a coalition of more than one player, a deviation is self-enforcing if there is no further selfenforcing and improving deviation by one of its proper sub-coalitions. The main focus of this paper is on the former notion.
A correlated strategy prole can be implemented by a mediator who privately recommends each player which action to play. It can also be implemented by a pre-play signaling process, a revealing protocol, that includes payo-irrelevant private and public signals (sunspots). Each player deduces his recommended action from the signals he has received. In the existing literature it is assumed that all the signals are received simultaneously by all the players ([9,13,25,26,29,30] ). However, the revealing protocol may be more complex. Few examples are:
• The recommendations can be revealed consecutively by private signals in a pre-specied order. An example for such a protocol is the polite cheap-talk protocol in [18] , which implements a large set of strong correlated equilibria as strong Nash equilibria in an extended game with cheap-talk. 2
• The players can receive private signals in a pre-specied order, where each signal includes partial information about the player's recommended action. 3
• The order in which the recommendations are revealed to the players may depend on a private lottery.
So that a revealing protocol can implement a correlated equilbirum it should 2 Cheap-talk is preEplyD unmeditedD nonEindingD nonEveri(le ommunition mong plyers @see IR for good nontehnil introdutionAF e hepEtlk protool is polite if t eh stge t most one plyer sends messgeF 3 por exmpleD t eh stge plyer my e informed out new unreommended tionX if the possile tions of plyer re {a, b, c} he my (rst e informed tht the reommended tion is not bD nd t lter stge e informed tht it is not c s wellF satisfy two properties. First, at the end of the protocol each player should know the action recommended to him. Second, no player should obtain any information about the actions recommended to the other players, except the conditional probability, given his own recommended action.
When all the players receive their recommended actions simultaneously, a coalition of players may communicate, share their information, and plan a joint deviation before, or after, the recommendations are revealed. In [25, 26, 29] it is assumed that players may only plan deviations at the ex-ante stage, before receiving the recommendations. In [9, 13, 30] it is assumed that players may only plan deviations at the ex-post stage, after receiving the recommendations.
When the players receive several signals, not necessarily simultaneously, they may communicate, share information, and plan coalitional deviations at different stages of the revealing protocol. By sharing information, a coalition of players may get information about the actions recommended to players outside the coalition, and may use this information to implement protable deviations. Similar to the existing literature of simultaneous revealing protocols, we focus on protocols in which sharing information among deviating players does not allow them to obtain any information about the actions recommended to the other players, except the conditional probability, given their own recommended actions.
The use of a joint deviation requires the unanimous agreement of all the members of the deviating coalition. A player agrees to be part of a joint deviation if, given his own information the deviation is protable to himself. Thus, if a joint deviation is implemented, then it is common knowledge among its members that each of them believes that the deviation is protable: the agreement of a player to participate in the joint deviation is a public signal to all the other deviating players that he believes that the deviation is protable (see the example in Sec. 3 for more details). We model the information structure of the deviating players by an incomplete information model (with the common prior assumption)à la Aumann ([4] tions at all stages. In Section 6 we discuss dierent approaches for coalitional stability, present the dierent notions of strong and coalition-proof equilibria, and discuss the implications of the main result.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and the main result. The result is demonstrated with an example in Section 3, and proven in Section 4. We deal with the coalition-proof notion in Section 5, and discuss the implications of the result in Section 6.
Model and Denitions

Preliminary Denitions
A game in strategic form G is dened as: S -strategy prole. Given q ∈ ∆(A) and a
, and for simplicity we omit the subscript:
All-stage Strong Correlated Equilibrium
A state space is a probability space, (Ω, B, µ) that describes all parameters that may be the object of uncertainty on the part of the players. We interpret Ω as the space of all possible states of the world, B as the σ-algebra of all measurable events, and µ as the common prior.
Given a non-null event E ∈ B and a random variable x : Ω → X (where X is a nite set), let x(E) ∈ ∆(X) denote the posterior distribution of x conditioned on the event E. The implementation of an agreement (a correlated strategy prole) by a mediator or by a signaling process is modeled by a random variable a : Ω → A, which satises that the prior distribution a(Ω) is equal to the agreement distribution.
Denition 1 Let G be a game, q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, and (Ω, B, µ) a state space. A recommendation prole that implements q is a random variable
A (joint) deviation of a coalition S is a random variable (in Ω) that is condi-
(Ω, B, µ) a state space, and a : Ω → A a recommendation prole that imple- When the members of a coalition S consider the implementation of a joint deviation, they are in a situation of incomplete information: each player may know his recommended action, and may have additional private information acquired when communicating with the other deviating players. We assume that the deviating players have no information about the actions recommended to the non-deviating players, except the conditional probability given the information they have about their recommended actions. We model this by the following denition of a consistent information structure.
Denition 3 Let G be a game, q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coalition,
(Ω, B, µ) a state space, and a : Ω → A a recommendation prole that im-plements q. An information structure (of S ) is a |S|-tuple of partitions of Ω (F i ) i∈S , whose join ( i∈S F i , the coarsest common renement of (F i ) i∈S ) consists of non-null events. We say that (F i ) i∈S is a consistent information structure,
We interpret F i as the information partition of player i; that is, if the true state of the world is ω ∈ Ω then player i is informed of that element F i (ω) of F i that contains ω.
When each player considers whether the implementation of a deviation is protable to himself, he compares his conditional expected payo when playing the original agreement and when implementing the deviation. A player agrees to deviate, only if the latter conditional expectation is larger. Formally, let
a deviation, and (F i ) i∈S a consistent information structure. The conditional expected payos of player i in ω ∈ Ω are:
• The conditional expected payo when all the players follow the agreement:
• The conditional expected payo when the members of S deviate, by implementing d S , and the players in −S follow the agreement:
If the players in S unanimously decide to implement a deviation in some state ω ∈ Ω, then it is common knowledge (in ω) that each player believes to earn more if the deviation is implemented. In that case we say that the joint deviation is protable. Formally:
space, (F i ) i∈S an information structure, and ω ∈ Ω a state. An event E ∈ B is common knowledge at ω if E includes that member of the meet
Denition 5 Let G be a game. q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coalition, (Ω, B, µ) a state space, and a : Ω → A a recommendation prole that implements q. A deviation (of S ) d S is protable, if there exists a consistent information structure (F i ) i∈S and a state ω 0 ∈ Ω such that it is common
In that case, we say that d S is a protable deviation (from the reccomendation prole a) with respect to the information structure (F i ) i∈S .
We can now dene an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium as a strategy prole, from which no coalition has a protable deviation.
Denition 6 Let G be a game. A strategy prole q ∈ ∆(A) is an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium if for every reccomendation prole a : Ω → A that implements q, no coalition S ⊆ N has a protable deviation.
Main Result
A prole is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium, if no coalition has a protable deviation at the ex-ante stage, when the players have no information about the recommendations.
Denition 7 Let G be a game and (Ω, B, µ) a state space. A strategy prole q ∈ ∆(A) is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium if for every reccomendation prole a : Ω → A that implements q, no coalition S ⊆ N has a protable deviation with respect to the ex-ante information structure (F i ) i∈S that sat-
One can verify that Def. 7 is equivalent to the denition of ([26] ). The denition immediately implies that an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium is also an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium. The main result shows that the converse is also true, and thus the two notions coincide.
Theorem 8 A correlated strategy prole is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium if and only if it is an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium.
An Example of the Main Result
In the following example we present an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium in a 3-player game, and a specic deviation that is considered by the grand coalition during a revealing protocol. At rst glance, one may think that this deviation is protable to all the players conditioned on their posterior information at that stage, but a more thorough analysis reveals that this is not the case. The analysis in this example provides the intuition for the use of a model of incomplete informationà la Aumann ([4]), for the common knowledge requirement in Def. 5 of a protable deviation, and for the main result. 
with an expected payo of 10 to each player. Observe that q is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium:
• The prole q is a correlated equilibrium, and thus no player has a unilateral protable deviation.
• No coalition of two players has a protable deviation, because their uncertainty about the action recommended to the third player prevents them from earning together more than 20 by a joint deviation.
• The grand coalition cannot earn more than a total payo of 30. Now, consider a stage of a revealing protocol in which player 1 has received a recommendation to play a 1 , player 2 has received a recommendation to play a 2 , and player 3 has not received a recommendation yet. No player knows whether the other players have received their recommended actions. At rst glance, the implementation of the deviation d(·) = (a 3 , b 3 , c 3 ), which gives a payo of (7, 11, 12) , may look protable to all the players:
• Conditioned on his recommended action (a 1 ), player 1 has an expected payo of 6 2 3
, and thus d is protable to him. The same is true for player 2.
• Player 3 does not know his recommended action. His ex-ante expected payo is 10, and he would earn a payo of 12 by implementing d.
However, a more thorough analysis reveals that d is unprotable for player 3. Player 1 can only earn from d if he has received a recommendation to play a 1 . Thus, if player 1 agrees to implement d, then it is common knowledge that he has received a 1 . The expected payo of players 2 and 3, conditioned on that player 1 has received a 1 , is 11 2 3
. Thus, if player 2 agrees to implement d (with a payo of 11) it is common knowledge that he has more information: his recommended action is a 2 . Therefore player 3 knows that if the others agree to implement d, then their recommended actions are (a 1 , a 2 ). Conditioned on that, his expected payo is 15, and thus d is unprotable for himself.
The Proof of the Main Result
In this section we prove the main result. As discussed earlier, one direction immediately follows from the denitions, and we only have to prove the other direction:
Theorem 9 Every ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium.
In other words: If a protable deviation from an agreement q ∈ (A) exists, then there also exists a protable ex-ante deviation from q. PROOF. Let q ∈ ∆(A) be an agreement that is not an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium in a game G, (Ω, B, µ) the state space, and a : Ω → A a recommendation prole that implements q. There exists a coalition S ⊆ N with a protable deviation d S : Ω → A S with respect to a consistent information structure (F i ) i∈S . This implies that there is a state ω 0 ∈ Ω , such that it is common knowledge in ω 0 that ∀i, 
Observe that d 
Equation (2) le P e woElyer qme nd n Ex-ante golitionEroof gorrelted iquilirium We rst show that the prole presented in Table 2 is an ex-ante coalition-proof equilibrium. Observe that the prole is a correlated equilibrium. [26] shows that in a two-player game, every correlated equilibrium that is not Paretodominated by another correlated equilibrium is a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. The prole gives each player a payo of 4. Thus we prove that it is an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium, by showing that any correlated equilibrium q gives player 1 a payo of at most 4. Let x = q (a 1 , b 1 ). Observe that q (a 2 , b 1 ) ≥ x/2 because otherwise player 2 would have a protable deviation: playing b 3 when recommended b 1 . This implies q (a 2 , b 2 ) ≥ x/2, because otherwise player 1 would have a protable deviation: playing a 1 when recommended a 2 . Thus the payo of q conditioned on that the recommenda-
is at most 4, and the fact that the payo of player 1 outside A is at most 3 completes the proof.
We now explain why this prole is not a self-enforcing agreement in a framework in which the players can also plan deviations at the ex-post stage. Assume that the players have agreed to play the prole, and player 1 has received a recommendation to play a 2 . In that case, he can communicate with player 2 at the ex-post stage, tell him that he has received a 2 (and thus if the players follow the recommendation prole they would get a payo of 2), and suggest a joint deviation: playing (a 3 , b 3 ). As player 1 has no incentive to lie, player 2 would believe him, and they would both play (a 3 , b 3 ). This ex-post deviation is self-enforcing because (a 3 , b 3 ) is a Nash equilibrium.
Observe that the same deviation is not self-enforcing at the ex-ante stage. The rst approach, is the Pareto dominance renement, in which the set of Nash equilibria is rened by restricting attention to its ecient frontier. This approach is popular in applications due to its advantages: existence in all games and the simplicity of its use. However, when there are more than 2 players, it ignores the ability of coalitions other than the grand coalition to privately agree upon a joint deviation. 5
Another approach is to explicitly model the procedure of communication as an extended-form game that species how messages are interchanged (e.g.: [5, 15, 28] ). However, the results are sensitive to the exact procedure employed, and usually strong restrictions have to be made to isolate the desired outcome.
5 es disussed in TDQSF QS presents set of onditions tht if stis(edD the two notions of reto dominne re(nement nd olitionEproof equilirium oinideF A dierent approach is the farsighted coalitional stability. Alternative variations are discussed in: [10, 16, 17, 24, 33, 34] . 6 These notions focus on environments where deviations are public. At each stage coalitions propose deviations from the current status-quo outcome, until nobody wishes to deviate further.
The set of possible nal outcomes is dened using stable setsà la von-Neumann & Morgenstern ([32] ). This approach is less appropriate when coalitions can privately plan deviations.
7
Strong and Coalition-Proof Equilibria
A Nash equilibrium is strong ([2] ) if no coalition, taking the actions of its complement as given, has an uncorrelated deviation that benets all of its members. A drawback of this notion, is that it exists in only a relatively small set of games. 8 [6] presents a wider renement of Nash equilibrium, which exists in more games: a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is coalition-proof if no coalition has a protable self-enforcing uncorrelated deviation. For a coalition of a single player any deviation is self-enforcing. For a coalition of more than one player, a deviation is self-enforcing if there is no further self-enforcing and improving uncorrelated deviation by one of its proper sub-coalitions. 9 The notion of coalition-proof equilibrium has been useful in a variety of applied contexts, such as: menu auctions ([7] ), oligopolies ([8,11,12,31] ), and common agency games ([22] ).
These notions focus on environments where coalitions can privately communicate before the play starts, and plan a joint deviation. However, they ignore 6 elso lled negotiation-proof equilibrium nd full coalitional equilibriumF 7 QRD etion I presents n exmple for the di'erene etween negotitionEproof equilirium nd olitionEproof xsh equiliriumF yserve tht the negotitionE proof equilirium in this exmpleD the pro(le (U, L, A)D is not plusile outome if the olition @{1, 2}A n privtely deviteF 8 ixmples for gmes where strong xsh equiliri exist re ongestion gmes @IWAY gmes where the preferenes stisfying independene of irrelevnt hoiesD nonymityD nd prtil rivlry @PHAY nd gmes where the ore of the oopertive gme derived from the originl norml form gmeD is nonEempty @see PID nd the referenes withinAF gonditions for the equivlene of strong nd olitionEproof xsh equiliri re presented in PI @gmes with popultion monotoniity propertyA nd in PP @ommon geny gmesAF 9 yserve tht only memers of the deviting olition my ontemplte devitions from the devitionF his rules out the possiility tht memers of the deviting olition might form pt to devite further with someone not inluded in this olitionF his limittion hs een ritiizedD espeilly in the literture tht dels with the frsighted olitionl stility pproh @desried erlierAF • The result in [18] , which shows that any punishable 10 ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium in an extended game with cheap-talk.
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• The example in [27] of an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium that is the only plausible outcome of a game with pre-play communication, as experimentally demonstrated in the referred paper.
Relations among Dierent Notions of Strong Correlated Equilibria
A deciency of the notion of strong correlated equilibrium, is that there are six dierent variants of it in the literature: three ex-ante notions and three expost notions. In this subsection we present these notions, the relations among them, and the implications of the main result.
Notions of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria have been presented in [26, 29, 25] . Our ex-ante denition is equivalent to the denition in [26] . In An ex-post strong correlated equilibrium can be dened in our framework, as a prole which is resistant to deviations at the ex-post stage when each 10 voosely spekingD strtegy pro(le is punishle if it retoEdomintes nother strtegy pro(leD even when the deviting plyers do joint shemeF 11 he implementtion presented in IV is only s n /2 Estrong xsh equiliriumX n equilirium tht is resistnt to devitions of olitions with less thn n /2 plyersF sf one ssumes tht the plyers re omputtionlly restrited nd oneEwy funtions existD then the implementtion n e s strong xsh equilirium @see IDPQAF 12 sn PW9s setupD the meditor n send n indiret signl to eh plyerD whih holds more informtion thn the reommendtion itselfF sn tht seD the unorreE lted devition is funtion from the set of the S Eprt of the signls to the set of unorrelted S Estrtegy pro(lesF sn our frmeworkD in whih olitions n use new orreltion deviesD ny ex-ante strong orrelted equilirium tht n e impleE mented y indiret signlsD n lso e implemented y diret orreltion devieF player knows his recommendation (i.e., no coalition S ⊆ N has a protable deviation with respect to an ex-post information structure (F i ) i∈S , in which:
Notions of ex-post strong correlated equilibria have been presented in [13, 30, 9] .
In (1) If a S ∈ E S , each player earns from implementing the deviation;
(2) If a S / ∈ E S , at least one player looses from implementing the deviation.
It can be shown that those conditions imply the existence of a protable deviation with respect to an ex-post information structure.
14 Thus our set of ex-post strong correlated equilibria is included in the other sets of equilibria.
The main result reveals inclusion relations among the dierent notions of strong correlated equilibria, which described in Fig. 1 . pigure IF eltions mong hi'erent xotions of trong gorrelted iquiliri @giA 13 st is equivlent to requiring tht ∀i ∈ S, ω ∈ Ω u i d (ω) > u i f (ω)F 14 he informtion struture is suh tht eh devitor would know his reommenE dtion nd whether a S (ω) ∈ E S F 15 ee PTD etion R for n exmple of n ex-post strong orrelted equilirium tht is not n ex-ante equiliriumF 6.4 Coalition-proof Correlated Equilibria A correlated equilibrium is coalition-proof if no coalition has a (possibly correlated) protable self-enforcing deviation. Again, a deciency of this notion is that there are six dierent variants of it in the literature (3 ex-ante and 3 ex-post).
16 It is possible to extend the model of incomplete information, and dene a notion of all-stage coalition-proof correlated equilibrium, by using an appropriate notion of consistent renements of information structures. However, the example in Section 5 shows that this notion does not coincide with the ex-ante coalition-proof notion, nor that there is any inclusion relations among the dierent coalition-proof notions.
17 Thus, the notion of coalitionproof correlated equilibrium is not robust: it is sensitive to the exact properties of the revealing protocol.
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